Torts - Recovery for Emotionally Produced Physical Distress by Allen, Raymond M.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 21 | Number 4
June 1961
Torts - Recovery for Emotionally Produced
Physical Distress
Raymond M. Allen
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Raymond M. Allen, Torts - Recovery for Emotionally Produced Physical Distress, 21 La. L. Rev. (1961)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol21/iss4/22
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of Torts27 indicates that a landowner's liability to trespassing
children is not measured entirely by the doctrine of ordinary
negligence, since the judge retains control over issues which nor-
mally would be allocated to the jury in an ordinary negligence
case. Thus, in cases of injury to infant trespassers, the judge is
free to find no cause of action when it is found that (1) likeli-
hood that children will trespass is slight; or (2) there is no un-
reasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm; or (3) the child
may have been of sufficient age to appreciate the danger. In
determining the risks against which infant trespassers are pro-
tected, the language of negligence appears to offer a more flex-
ible medium than does attractive nuisance. For these reasons it
appears that Louisiana courts might well consider replacing at-
tractive nuisance with a modified form of negligence.
Bert K. Robinson
TORTS- RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONALLY PRODUCED
PHYSICAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff brought suit for personal physical injuries arising
out of her fright caused by a traffic accident.' The accident
occurred when defendant negligently drove her small foreign
car from her driveway and struck plaintiff's car. Plaintiff im-
mediately feared that she had struck and killed a child, and
upon learning the truth was relieved and stated to defendant
that she was unharmed. Plaintiff went home and later in the
day became nervous and upset. This nervousness grew steadily
worse until she developed physical damage in the form of a con-
version reaction. 2 Approximately a month prior to the accident
a small child had driven her bicycle into the side of a car being
driven by plaintiff's brother-in-law, and was killed. Expert
testimony in the present case was to the effect that this incident
in plaintiff's family made her more susceptible to the fright
caused by her accident with defendant. In the lower court, plain-
tiff was allowed recovery for her injuries. On appeal to the
27. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
1. Plaintiff also sued for damages for her automobile and was awarded $200
by the trial court. This part of the trial court's decision was affirmed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.
2. GouLD, MEDICAL DICTIONARY 242 (Blakiston ed. 1949) : "Conversion- In
psychiatry, a mental defense mechanism whereby unconscious emotional conflict is
transformed into physical disability."
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North Carolina Supreme Court, held, reversed. Recovery will
not be allowed for the physical consequences of fright induced
by an unreasonable fear for the safety of an imagined third
person. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48
(1960).
Generally courts deny recovery for negligently caused mental
disturbance.8 However, when negligence causes physical injury
which is accompanied by fright, virtually all courts will allow
recovery for both the physical injury and the fright.4 When neg-
ligence causes only a mental disturbance such as fright or fear,
and the mental disturbance results in physical damage, often
recovery will be allowed for the resulting physical damage.5
However, some courts will not allow recovery for this damage,
unless there has been impact," seemingly as a matter of proof
of genuineness of the claim. The impact requirement appears
to be easily satisfied, however, 7 as exemplified by the case where
plaintiff heard a crash and suffered fright which caused her
to faint, and the court allowed the falling of her body to the
floor to satisfy the impact requirement." As an additional re-
quirement, most courts state that a plaintiff must base his claim
on fear or fright for his own safety before recovery will be
allowed for resulting physical damages.9 In Waube v. Warring-
3. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, n. 1 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 180, § 37,
n. 24 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 313, 436(2) (1934).
4. Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920) ; Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548,
120 Atl. 74 (1923) ; Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457, 135 P.2d 283 (1943) ; 1
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 461 (1906).
5. Sloane v. Southern California Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896) ; Orlo
v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) ; Purcell v. St. Paul City
R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Kelly v. Lowney, 113 Mont. 385,
126 P.2d 486 (1942) ; Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Co., 232 S.C.
593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958) ; Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W.
944 (1900).
6. Kentucky Traction and T. Co. v. Roman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272
(1929) ; Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (1924) ; Mitchell v.
Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) ; Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.
R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) ; Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa. St. 396,
135 A.2d 101 (1957).
7. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga.App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928)
Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910) ; Homans v. Boston Elev.
R.R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) ; Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 73
N.J. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906) ; Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56
A.2d 89 (1948).
8. Black v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 Atl. 210 (1930).
9. Southern R.R. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Ellsworth v.
Masacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921) ; Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174,
71 A.2d 792 (1950); Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168
(1937) ; Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
Contra, Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Frazee v.
Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
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ton 0 the court found that where a mother feared for the safety
of her child when she witnessed defendant's act of negligently
killing the child, the defendant owed no duty to the mother for
her physical damage caused by the fright. A third usual re-
quirement for recovery is that the negligence which caused the
fright must have been such that a normal person would suffer
fright." However, once the defendant's conduct is shown to
have created a situation which would induce fear in a normal
person, the courts hold the defendant liable for damages caused
thereby, even though the plaintiff is highly susceptible to
fright.12
It is difficult to draw a general conclusion from the avail-
able cases as to the Louisiana position on negligently caused
fright. Apparently recovery will be allowed for physical dam-
ages resulting from fright in situations similar to those where
recovery has been allowed in other jurisdictions.' s Dictum in-
dications to the effect that recovery for nervous damage alone
10. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
11. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) ; Hass v. Metz, 78 II.
App. 46 (1898) ; Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897)
Ward v. West Jersey and S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900).
12. Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Purcell v.
St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
13. In the case of Stewart v. Arkansas Southern Ry., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676
(1904), plaintiff suffered a miscarriage which resulted from fright caused by a
minor train accident. The Supreme Court said that it would be convenient to
adopt the rule that no recovery of any kind may be had for fright, caused by
negligence of another, even though its consequences are most serious- such as
blindness, insanity, or miscarriage, but that the text of the Civil Code looks to
liability for all damages. The court allowed recovery for the miscarriage resulting
from the fright.
In Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So. 203 (La. App. 1937), the court denied
recovery because of lack of proof that plaintiff suffered a fright when she heard
a brick wall crash into the side of the building she was in. However, the court
stated that damages could be had for nervous shock resulting from negligently
caused fright even though there was no physical injury if it be proven that the
nervous shock was suffered.
In Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929), plain-
tiff was negligently knocked off his bicycle by a truck being driven by a servant
of defendant. Plaintiff was not physically injured, but suffered a fright and
resulting nervousness. The court allowed damages for the temporary nervousness
on the basis of the Stewart case.
In Klein v. Medical Building Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La. App. 1933), plain-
tiff suffered fright when a large piece of plaster fell from the ceiling of defend-
ant's building and either hit him or fell near him. The court allowed recovery for
traumatic hysteria resulting from the negligently caused fright on a showing by
a preponderance of evidence that plaintiff suffered from traumatic hysteria.
There was no clear evidence of impact so it would seem that this case might
indicate that impact is not required in Louisiana.
In Favalora v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 143 La. 572, 78 So. 944 (1918),
plaintiff suffered a nervous shock which resulted in physical discomforts and
nervousness when a street car in which she was riding negligently collided with
another street car. The court considered only the evidence of nervous shock and
allowed recovery upon sufficient proof.
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will be allowed are probably explainable by the difficulties of
distinguishing between physical and emotional harm.1 4 Probably
a correct conclusion is that the Louisiana courts are substantially
in accord with the general law on the subject of physical injury
resulting from negligently caused fright.
In the instant case, the court relied upon many points in sup-
port of its denial of recovery.'5 Probably the greatest reliance
was placed on the remote relationship between what plaintiff
believed and what actually occurred. In other words, the court
seems to have felt plaintiff was not reasonable in fearing that
a child had been struck simply because she heard a grinding
noise.' Apparently the courts have not generally inquired into
the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear, even though in the
majority of fright cases the fear is of something which does
not actually happen. 17  It would seem that traditional tort
analysis would not involve this type of inquiry. Tort law is
settled that when a person negligently injures another who has
a latent physical defect and the injury is more severe than it
normally would be because of the latent defect, the defendant
14. Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929)
Favalora v. New Orleans By. & Light Co., 143 La. 572, 78 So. 944 (1918)
Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So. 203 (La. App. 1937).
15. Williamson v. Bennet, 251 N.C. 498, 507-08, 112 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1960)
"It was not the collision that caused her anxiety, it was something that did not
exist at all, a phantom child on a non-existent bicycle .... [IH]er failure to look
is a contributing cause of her fright, a cause without which the anxiety would
not have arisen. . . . [T]here can be no recovery for fright and anxiety, and
resultant neurosis, which arises for the safety and well-being of another ...
The defendant was under no duty to anticipate or to take precautions against
a mere possibility that plaintiff or other persons might imagine a state of facts
that did not exist."
16. The court seemed to feel that defendant should not be liable for what
might have or could have happened, but only for what actually did happen. It
would seem that the court could have found that plaintiff was reasonable in
assuming that she had struck a child. She was driving in the vicinity of a school
and this could have been one of the thoughts that flashed through her mind in
the split second that she realized that an accident had occurred. Perhaps this
could have contributed to her erroneous conclusion, as well as did the fresh im-
pression that was present because of her brother-in-law's experience. At any
rate, she did not have time for detached reflection as to what had happened, for
she heard the grinding sound and suffered the fright more or less simultaneously.
The court also stated that plaintiff contributed to her fright because she could
have glanced down through her side window and seen what had happened. It
would seem that normally fright -would occur before a person looks around in this
type of situation and that it would require a most unusual person to examine a
situation rationally when violently surprised and frightened.
17. E.g., in the recent case of Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d
149 (1959), the Connecticut Supreme Court allowed recovery for physical injury
resulting from fright caused by a belief that an earthquake was in progress when
a negligently driven truck struck her house. The court did not go into the problem
of whether plaintiff was reasonable in jumping to the conclusion that an earth-
quake was occurring.
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is nonetheless held liable for the results of his negligence.18 It
would seem that this general rule that the defendant takes his
victim as he finds him would be equally applicable in the instant
type of case.
The general rule, also relied upon to some extent by the court
in the instant case, that a defendant is not liable for physical
injury resulting from a plaintiff's fear for a third person, has
had its usual application in situations where the plaintiff is
not within the zone of danger.' 9 Seemingly, the reason for this
rule is to enable the courts to deal with case where difficulties
of proof militate against establishing the possibility of recovery.
It would seem, however, that in a situation where the plaintiff
is within the zone of danger and consequently could recover if
he feared for himself, the mere fact that he feared for another
should not preclude recovery. Since a person in a frightening
situation does not have complete control over the direction his
mind takes, there seems no good reason for penalizing him for
not fearing for his own safety. No matter what mental
gymnastics are undergone, the result reached is still the same;
physical injury resulted from negligently caused fright.
Raymond M. Allen
TORTS - TRESPASS TO LAND - LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
INJURIES
Plaintiff brought an action in trespass quare clausum fregit
for damages to real property and personal injuries occasioned
by the trespass. Plaintiff was a tenant in possession of certain
premises. Defendant drove a truck onto the premises and dam-
aged the steps of plaintiff's home. Nine days later plaintiff was
injured by falling while attempting to use the broken steps. In
his petition, plaintiff made no allegation that defendant was neg-
ligent when he damaged the steps. The trial court granted de-
fendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that this was a con-
sequential injury for which recovery could not be had. On appeal
1 8
. Patterson v. Steamship Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (1930) ; Kalaf v.
Assyd, 60 Ariz. 33, 130 P.2d 1036 (1942) ; Campbell v. Los Angeles Traction
Co., 137 Cal. 565, 70 Pac. 624 (1902); Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 92
N.J.L. 277, 105 Atl. 459 (1918).
19. Southern R.R. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E 917 (1900) ; Nuckles
v Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927) ; Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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